How to Understand Nonsense? The Role of Imagination in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus

In 2022, I was awarded a three-year research grant Sonatina 6 for project How to Understand Nonsense? The Role of Imagination in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by National Science Centre, Poland (NCN). Project Number: 2022/44/C/HS1/00054.

Click here to see an abstract of the project.

Here is a popular description of the project: In Polish. In English.

Main aims of the project

Proposing a novel theory, which would explain how do we ‘understand’ the nonsensical Tractarian sentences
Explaining what is the mechanism behind the ‘understanding’ of nonsensical sentences in general (in fiction, art, and in other domains)
Providing a useful and coherent construal of ineffability
Proposing a framework encompassing the resolute reading, the austere view, an ontological reading of ineffability and the distinction knowledge-that/knowledge-how.

The chief problem

In 6.54 of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein famously claims that sentences [Sätze] of his work are nonsensical [unsinning].

Standardly, if I understand sentence s, then there is proposition p that I entertain and that is expressed by means of sentence s. However, in the case of nonsensical sentences, there are no propositions expressed by them (this is the common ground between the substantial and the austere view of nonsense).

How is it possible that we ‘understand’ the nonsensical Tractarian sentences? Is there such a thing as an understanding of a nonsensical sentence?

I propose to answer the main problem by reference to pretense (as it is understood in the theory of fiction).

Papers:

1. A Defence of the Austere View of Nonsense, Synthese 201 (5), 1-30. 2023. PDF (Open Access)..

2. The Riddle of Understanding Nonsense, Organon F, 30 (4), 372–411. PDF (Open Access).

3. A paper on Wittgenstein's view of understanding nonsense [the title withheld for blind review]. Status: in review.

Talks:

1. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Saying-Showing Distinction, the workshop ‘Wittgenstein and Hegel – Normativity and Rationality’, University of Zagreb, 9-11 September 2024.

2. Ineffability, Knowledge and Content, 16th World Congress of Semiotics, University of Warsaw, 2-6 September 2024.

3. Types of Things That Cannot Be Said, 25th World Congress of Philosophy, Sapienza University of Rome, 1-8 August 2024.

4. The Pretense Theory of Understanding Nonsense, MLAG Seminar, University of Porto, 26.04.2023.

5. How to Understand Nonsense? A Riddle, Seminar Series in Analytic Philosophy 2022-23, University of Lisbon, 19.05.2023.

6. Wittgenstein's conception of understanding nonsense, 11th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Vienna, August 2023.

7.The Pretense Theory of Understanding Nonsense, XI Polski Zjazd Filozoficzny, University of Łódź, September 2023.